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Alan and I: Of Community, Critical Legal
Studies and All That
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGELt

Prosper, raise strong families, remembering that all you
will leave behind is your good works and your children.
Colin Powell

It is painful to speak of friends in the past tense. Indeed, I
would have been perfectly happy to put off writing this piece for
twenty or thirty years. Not forever mind you; I prefer to be the
one who gets to put out the lights. But twenty or thirty years
would have been quite satisfactory. Sadly such was not to be.
And writing is not made easier by Alan who, now over two
years ago, right after receiving the diagnosis of pancreatic cancer, said, "Schlegel, you will write the truth for my boys."
Alan, you were so impossible. To make such a request when
you of all people knew how problematic is my relationship to the
notion of "truth" once it is stretched beyond the absence of lies.
You who knew how little I could abide being the "authorized"
anything, hesitant even to open the jar of clearasil for zits of the
personality or institution that goes with that role and indiscrete
to the core. And what do I have to offer your boys that they
might find valuable out of our friendship, a shared curiosity of
the mind? Surely they wish more to know what made you weep,
what made you laugh, what made you mourn and what made
you dance.
Alan, this perverseness somehow captures you better than
any story I can tell. You knew all of the reasons why what you
asked was difficult and went ahead anyway because what I
might say you wanted said, however painful to the speaker or
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Laura, Al, Phil, George
and Frank helped me wrestle with this shade. I suppose that none of these individuals
approve entirely of the results of those efforts. Alan would have exulted in the epigraph
that I have supplied.
What follows may be justly criticized for departing from the norm for such memorial
utterances by displaying too much of the author's ego. I can see no other way to speak.
Few of us are world-historical figures deserving of that impersonal praise or blame appropriate to a cathedral or battle. Death, absence is personal, because presence, life is
personal. If my mourning can have any meaning for others, it is because, though it is
mine, it somehow resonates with theirs. Effacing the author can only hide the essential
limitedness of my observations. As is often the case in the fin de siecle West, it is the
norm that is wrong, though not the impulse.
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audience. Well, for once I will do as I am told. This is for you
James and Jeremy. Hope some day you find important the questions that it tries to answer.
I met Alan at the first CLS meeting. Walking to Tom Heller's house at a ferocious pace that I later came to enjoy, but on
that day was only exhausting in the heat of a mid-western summer, I was struck with Alan's vibrant enthusiasm and his talking and thinking at great speed and with great clarity. In the
big room in Madison where we all met he seemed part of the in
crowd, an appearance reinforced by his hanging out with
Duncan Kennedy and Peter Gabel smoking cigars, yes, big, fragrant cigars, under a bush in the Heller back yard. Years later I
learned that Alan was as lonely and out of it at that meeting as
most of the rest of us, knowing only those two people, and only
Peter well.
The impression made by Alan's presentation at that meeting and my discussion with him on that walk was strong enough
that I inquired whether he might be interested in moving to
Buffalo. He said he was happy at Minnesota and I left it at
that. I later learned that his assertion of happiness wasn't true
either, that things with Iris were turning awful-in Alan's
words, "I was engaging in much badness, Schlegel"-and that it
was only law school teaching that was going well.
I saw little of Alan at the Minneapolis CLS meeting the
next year. Some pleasant words, at most. And so when Alan was
ready to leave Minnesota, he called Fred with whom he had
spent some time at the fabled, pointless CLS meeting at Santa
Cruz with Hayden White's history of consciousness group. I
passed that one up; family life was then too thick. At that time
Alan, unknowingly, was deep in what became a family life with
Betty too.
When Alan first came to Buffalo, I spent less time with
Alan than with Betty who needed support as she was finding
that the stress of raising two adolescent boys in a small house,
really a cottage, was not diminished when your lover soon turns
deathly ill with ulcerative colitis. These years were part of what
Betty, none too fondly, calls Alan's 'hippie phase." His focus was
Al's evening seminar and that wonderfully productive, deeply intellectual floating crap game did not fit with my family life
either.
Why tell you, his sons, this story that puts me in the center
and not Alan? Simply this. Think twice before believing anything that I have to say. There was nothing foreordained in our
friendship; indeed in many ways it was implausible. He was a
doctrinalist; I was not. He hung out with the machers; I did not.
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And there were divisions about politics and moralism too. Our
friendship only really began when I felt my marriage was going
under and chose to call him for comfort. He told me that I was
mistaken; he knew what marriage break up was and I wasn't
even close. But the good soul that he was, he began to call regularly to look after my mental well-being and from those daily
phone calls grew a friendship that, though it was anything but
painless, I treasured.
When Alan and Betty began to write in dissent from Roe v.
Wade many people were heard to say that Alan had finally
flipped out. Marxism was OK, if a bit old fashioned; animals,
weird, though not dangerous; but dissent from one of the pillars
of liberal academic orthodoxy, that was proof of insanity, of
Alan's having crossed over to the dark side. That school of
thought always amused me. While definitely an academic, Alan
was anything but a liberal. He spent much of his academic life
making fun of liberal legalism, of rights talk-and he spent the
rest of his life placing himself in opposition, indeed in defining
himself oppositionally, to whatever orthodoxy he could find or
conjure up. So, while Alan's dissent from Roe was anything but
necessary, if you understood Alan you would have understood
that good money could have been made by betting that had Alan
paid attention to Roe he would have figured out a reason to dissent from it.
Why was it not necessary? Not for the usual theoretical reasons about the falseness of necessity, but because Alan's was an
omnivorous mind. That mind is what made his daily phone calls
a pleasure. There was no telling what the topic would be. There
were constants, of course; that national politics and academic
politics were staples, would surprise no one. And food, especially
Chinese food, and later, bread. Art and, nearer the end, a return
to one of his earlier passions, music were always topics for discussion. And countless hours were spent as Alan worked out the
details of his analysis with respect to whatever topic he was
writing about at the time. But there were other topics that were
in some ways more revealing.
One was science, especially animal behavior, physics, chaos
theory and any odd bit that might puncture the pretense of the
scientific establishment to neutral rationality. Here I supplied
stories from Scientific American and Alan, newspaper articles
and books-he loved Carl Degler's book and anything written by
Steven J. Gould. Learning, especially the mysteries of how
humans- even law students-learn and why was somehow a
separate discussion, fueled by my work with the LSAT folks and
his skepticism about tests---!Tests test the ability to take tests,
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Schlegel"-as well as his ultimate faith that a kind of cautious,
not necessarily methodologically rigorous, empiricism could
yield, if not truth, at least insight.
Another regular topic was family and raising children. Alan
loved children, at least once they were out of diapers. And he
understood them well. I can remember him saving Joanne's and
my sanity at my son's fifth or sixth birthday party by inventing
the game "Dead Bugs"-as in, "Now pretend that you are bugs
and that I just sprayed and you are now dead. The best dead
bug gets a prize." And it was he who recognized that for kids
that age the uglier the monster the better. It was this love and
understanding that was at the root of the wonderful article he
and Betty did for Tikkun about Dr. Seuss. It was this love and
understanding that enveloped Jenney and his boys and, in time,
Betty's boys, John and Josh, too. It was this love and understanding that came over the phone daily. Here the regular grist
was sickness and health, child care and school, talents and their
lack and in the last few years computer games and science fiction and horror movies and TV. The games and movies, and also
a spurt where the topic was all of Shakespeare's plays available
on video, were a way that Alan, knowing that he was an intellectual and so that what he thought about for a living made
poor family conversation, found to share life with his boys.
As I remember our conversations there was still another recurrent topic-sex. Alan was a lusty soul; he delighted in the
sexual ways of the world. Talk was never prurient or even particularly ribald, but Alan had the joy of a medieval farmerChaucer was one of his favorite writers-at the absurd fecundity
of nature. Mammalian sexual behavior, especially that of felines
and chimps, was a recurrent topic, but I can also remember his
continuing laughter over the comment of a radical feminist student who suggested that the world would be better if all male
chicks were castrated and his observation that living with Betty
carried with it the risk of humans multiplying like rabbits. And
then there was his wonderfully funny, extended put down of
Bruce Ackerman's book as an exercise in male potency imagery.
Curiously though, Alan's interest in sex was not accompanied by
a need for male bodily display. He was no peacock. Even before
his colostomy I never saw Alan less than fully, generally baggily
clothed or at least with a bathrobe tied ever so tight, unless one
counts as unclothed his hairy, muscular calves sticking out of
his shorts.' And after the colostomy his sensitivity to his body
1. Peter Gabel reports that this was not always the case. He remembers a time in
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meant that he developed a nervous habit of checking whether
his bag was in place, sometimes every five minutes.
Having the world brought to my door in this way, for
months at a time on a daily basis, was a wonderful experience.
It often raised my spirits; even more often it expanded the fund
of useless information that I have squirreled away. Always, in
its recurrence, it was comforting like a night light in ones life.
There was, however, a down side to Alan's regular attentions;
nothing associated with Alan had the unadulterated singular
pleasure of Al's standard-the Breyers chocolate ripple ice
cream cone. Alan had a tenacious preference for controlling the
agenda of our little discussions and his intense competitiveness
was never far from the surface. Often conversations would start
with, "Well, what did you do today, Schlegel?" But, unless I offered one of my rambling, seemingly (and often actually) pointless narratives, the conversation shifted to what Alan wanted to
talk about on which there was generally only one opinion to be
had-Alan's. It was not that Alan would brook no dissent from
his opinion. Precisely the contrary; he loved an argument and
was both ferocious in it and ferociously good at it. But, unless I
wanted to go to the mat for a while there was no point in dissent. It was just easier to listen and respond, if at all, at a later
time when thoughts were more coherent and so field advantage
more neutral.
Neutralizing field advantage with Alan was essential,
though often impossible, in all sorts of pursuits. Several times
we either rode bikes or walked together for many days in a row,
an activity that Frank Munger, who at times shared or separately engaged in this activity with Alan, dubbed the Amherst
Land Use Field Seminar because land use was always before
our eyes and so a recurrent topic. These could be truly exhausting forays for Alan's pace was grueling. And yet, when I could
observe Alan coming to our agreed meeting place before he noticed me, I would see that he walked or rode rather leisurely; it
was only after I had been noticed that Alan began to pump it
out.
That was the dynamic in our fabled book review collaboration, "Sex, Power and Silliness," the one that Richard Posner
later labeled "sheer infantilism."2 I wrote first (as Betty always
Minnesota when to attempt to banish alienation from and encourage openness in a gathering in his home Alan took off all of his clothes and sat in the middle of the floor leading the discussion.
2. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline, 100 HARv. L.
REv. 761, 768 (1990).

Fall 1996]

ALAN FREEMAN

did) and produced an essentially complete, intemperate review.
Alan wrestled for a long time (writing for him was always much
harder than the final product seemed), gave up attempting to
rewrite my work and so added the long section on Ackerman
and sex. I can vividly remember his wild excitement on the
phone when he laid out all of the relevant passages in the book.
I then provided a dialogue to frame the whole, since the two
pieces of our review were essentially unrelated. That assertion
of finality didn't sit very well either, so Alan added to the beginning an epigrammatic passage from Beckett. I do not wish to
dump on the resulting product. Indeed, as a matter of mature
thought I, who on the whole enjoyed his "hippie phase," probably approve more of the resulting product than did Alan who in
the last few years was more concerned with temperate statement than I ever will be. Making fun is at times the only sane
response to a world that does not listen. But the dynamic of its
production was pure Alan, competitive to the core.
Competitiveness was, I suppose, an important reason why
we never tried to teach together. We talked about doing so from
time to time, but neither ever pushed it. I think that fighting
for the podium would have bothered us both. There was another
reason, of course. Alan, who at his full bearded, long haired,
pepper and salt, balding best looked like a cross between an old
testament prophet, Karl Marx and one of the Smith Brothers,
was essentially a moralist concerned with the rightness of the
rules he taught. I am not. Doctrinal exegesis of law always
leaves me cold; "That isn't the way law is done," says my mind.
Moralism has little attraction either; understanding is enough.
But for Alan doctrine was the center of legal education. The
point of theory and other resources apart from the rules was the
insight that these sources brought to understanding and critiquing, justifying, as I, stealing from Al, like to put it, the rules.
And so, Alan, who was a good, though like most of us, undisciplined, social scientist and a careful historian, mindful of his
sources, seldom wanted just to know about the past of law in its
strange pastness or of the present of law in its wonderful oddness; almost always the point of his inquiry was to uncover
something that he thought was important material for his doctrinal enterprise, for the job of piecing out arguments for the
correct rules of law.
Alan was thus, like most of our CLS friends, a very traditional law teacher. The center of his consciousness was the common law of property. He often argued to me the desirability of
recreating the two semester property course and never could
heap enough praise on the work of one of my heroes, Charles E.
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Clark, though not for his empirical work, but for a book on covenants that run with the land, or on the work of a great English
property conveyancer, Sir Orlando Bridgeman. Alan could always be heard to say at a crucial point in each year's property
course, "By the time I am done they really know their future interests!" And common-law, case method decision-making was so
deep in his core that over the last few years he had been lamenting the disappearance of that method in the work of the
Supreme Court and arguing for its reintroduction by trumpeting
the work of Sandra Day O'Connor, hardly a liberal heroine,
whom he believed, with more than a little warrant, practiced it.
Alan never fought clinical work, but it was also clear that
he considered it secondary to the examination of norms that he
did in the class room. This relatively benign pose is to be contrasted with his constant, wonderfully tenacious opposition to
my attempts to undermine the common law categories-contract, tort, property, crime-that anchor the first year and replace them with non-doctrinal categories either rooted in recurrent problems or in lawyer's activities. His argument was always
a variation on the proposition that students needed to know the
old ways of thinking before they could criticize them and so
learn better ways of thinking, but the sub-text was always,
"Schlegel, you simply don't understand how important doctrine
is." And it was this sense of the centrality of the law school doctrinal categories that led Alan to venture into teaching AntiTrust law when it atrophied because the faculty could never
find an economist it could agree on hiring, as well as to offer a
course in International Trade law. Coverage was important.
The center of all of Alan's moralism/criticism, both in class
and in print, was his objection to exclusion and so his championing of the causes of the excluded. This is what holds together
his early article on zoning, his anti-discrimination piece and his
discussion of the abortion question. It informed much of his participation in faculty politics and ultimately brought about his estrangement from critical legal studies. Alan was, or at least
thought of himself as, a one man counter-hegemonic enclave,
however much he later ridiculed that concept. Not all would
agree where the relevant hegemony might lie and Alan could
flip amazingly quickly in his estimate on the matter, most recently when Bill Clinton turned from hero to goat in less than a
month after his first policy pronouncement was on gays in the
military and not on economic security for working Americans.
Still, if one could accept his evaluation of where the social power
lie, one could reasonably easily come to understand where his
thought would go.
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Once I understood this thread in Alan's work I tried to
probe gently as to its origin. While it would be neat if I could
demonstrate that the perpetual outsider had canonized the outsider's perspective, I do not think that such is the case. Alan seldom talked lovingly of the community he grew up in, but there
is no reason to believe that he was any more of an outsider in
that community than often is the case with the average bright,
middle-class kid turned intellectual. And while he was surely
never a social BMOC .at either Brown or NYU, he clearly was
potentially enough of an insider in the legal community to have
ended up as Editor-in-Chiefof his law review, an Edward Weinfeld clerk and a summer associate at Cravath. And he was valued enough by that firm as a prospective employee that it was
willing to pull strings to get Alan a commission as a Captain in
the Air Force with a nice assignment in the Pentagon doing contracts work at a time when the alternative was a realistic possibility of being cannon fodder in South-East Asia. But Alan did
not revel in this world. His conversation never mentioned his
clerkship; seldom, his time at the Pentagon and I did not know
until after his death what his rank there was. While he talked
reasonably positively about pieces of his legal education, he
never spoke of his time on the NYU Law Review and his only
tie to Cravath was an heavy weight envelope of the kind fancy
law firms use that he always wanted me to introduce my corporations class with-an example of the opulence that it was all
about.
Alan's categories of outsiders shifted over time in response
to his reading of the contemporary political scene. This was
most notable in race relations. When he came to Buffalo, Derrick Bell was moved to call him an "inverse oreo," white on the
outside, but black on the inside, this on the strength of the antidiscrimination piece. That piece effectively contrasted the "victim" and the "perpetrator" perspectives on civil rights, the one
emphasizing the hurt that comes form a thousand, nameless
cuts and the other emphasizing causation and individual responsibility for individual acts. I doubt that Derrick would say
the same thing today. Over time as affirmative action became a
leftist orthodoxy Alan's views changed. Part of that change came
from watching affirmative action policy in our own school, as individuals that he perceived to be weak admittees not only failed
to excel, but also slid along the bottom of the class, all but wearing failure on their faces, then often failed the bar exam and,
for Alan at least, had their lives destroyed, all in the name of
liberal benevolence. Liberal benevolence was always a dubious
proposition for Alan. So, while he worked to get the Law School
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to support the minority students we admitted with a strong,
hands on legal methods program and with follow up support for
bar exam preparation, he also worked to reduce substantially
the number of students admitted so as both to strengthen the
group by eliminating the weakest and to provide the strongest
possible support by relying on the few faculty Alan felt to be
most committed to mounting a good program as he saw it, all of
which was, of course, not necessarily how others saw it.
In time Alan came to see the white, hourly and salaried
working class of large families, evangelical religious affiliation,
traditional values and little economic opportunity as being ignored or worse denigrated by the liberal, especially the liberal
academic, establishment. And so he began to champion their
cause, not as articulated by the right wing politicians who
sought to profit from their discontent, but in terms of the values, particularly the religious values, that were important to
them. In reasonably short order he concluded that affirmative
action had to go. Law needed the victim's perspective; it did not
need to institutionalize, much less expand, victimization. Even
worse, for Alan affirmative action distinguished between equally
needy, equally, though differently, marginalized individuals in a
way that seemed designed to disparage the values of home,
work and family of the whites, particularly ethnic whites.
Whether Alan was correct in any sense in his analysis is, I
think, largely an unimportant question, here at least. What is
important to see is how his shift on affirmative action fits with
other shifts in his perception of dominance, and thus in his opposition to it, in American life. There is no doubt that the hardest thing that Alan ever wrote was his Harvard Civil RightsCivil Liberties Review piece answering his critics among the
Critical Race Theorists. The piece came after nearly ten years of
almost complete silence as he struggled in his head to write the
promised follow up to the anti-discrimination article. It was a
particularly bad time for Alan. He and I had had an enormous
fight in which he screamed me out of his house over what he
considered my unprincipled behavior. And the intellectual substance of the topic was anything but easy. Counseling and tranquilizers (and much love from Betty) were all that got him
through. Alan's point, said more pithily to me than ever in
print-rights are OK but recognize that they are a second choice
to the support that membership in the community provideswas anything but welcome to that group for whom rights were a
mark of acceptance in civil society and community only a measure of both that from which they had been excluded and that
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narrower set of attachments-the black community-that had
made the larger exclusion modestly endurable.
There was an unbridgeable gulf here that I think neither
side understood at the time and it was not just about community, but also about the primacy of the personal. For Alan rights
were hollow because the indeterminacy of their verbal formulation allowed community understandings of meaning to shape
both application and enforcement. That was the point of his
anti-discrimination piece; racial discrimination could be legitimated in the act of enforcing anti-discrimination law. His was
essentially a sociological observation about law in any liberal society. The response from the critical rights theorists was, "But
we feel more like citizens when we have rights that are enforceable and besides your community hasn't been very hospitable
while ours has been better." For Alan that observation was personally painful-he had worked to make his community more
hospitable-and irrelevant. Feeling good was always a positive
thing, but it was essentially beside the point. Becoming a part of
a community, sharing and transforming its norms in the process
of gaining membership, was the only way to secure the protection of law. Caring about how one felt was only setting oneself
up for fall after fall.
There is a certain wonderful irony in this position of Alan's.
It was only through being a part of a community, sharing and
contesting its values, that one could secure the benefits of law.
But, as a member of the community one didn't really need the
benefits of law, for the logical indeterminacy of the rules would
work, not against one as it had before membership was secured,
but in one's favor. We never talked much about this particular
perversity of the law. Indeed, as I think about it now, Alan
never talked much about community with me at all. He clearly
enjoyed community when he found it. The early years of CLS
are a great example. He reveled in the lives and times and discussions and the simple energy of a reasonably diverse group of
new friends. And I like to think that he had the same response
in his early years at Buffalo ... though those years were entirely too filled with the ulcerative colitis that led to his near
death from a surgery postponed too long.
But, our community didn't last long, I am afraid. Alan
never understood, and to the extent he understood clearly rejected, the tyranny that comes with community, the cost in
terms of conformity with community norms, swallowing individual objections because, well, "It just wasn't worth it," the limits
to appropriate behavior that come with community membership.
Nor could he ever accept the notion that communities are cre-
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ated by drawing lines, by excluding others from membership because of their values, their desires, their activities. Alan's model
was, I suppose, CLS in the early years, not that CLS did anything other than move to exclude the left-wing empiricists from
the group at the outset. So, he most often fought for inclusion,
most notably of blacks and religious whites, but also, when it
came to hiring decisions, of conservative economists.
Alan's support for inclusion did not mean that he was always, even often, accepting toward the members of the community he found himself in. He seemed to have had a rule that
outsiders could do no wrong and that insiders were to be held to
his and not to the community's standard of behavior. Thus, at
one time or another virtually all of us felt the sting of Alan's
disapproval. My tongue-lashing, provided because I allowed myself to become the focus for our faculty to protest, correctly I
thought then and still believe now, the action of the Provost in
imposing a dean on the Law School over the opposition, largely
united, of the faculty, was followed with nearly two lonely years.
during which Alan refused to talk with me. I recently was told
that Peter, Alan's longest and dearest friend, received the same
painful treatment at some period of their friendship, though for
what transgression I do not know. Alan's disapproval of Al after
his arrest was, I suspect, less keenly felt, but no less real; they
had grown apart somewhat over issues that I really never did
understand, but that Alan attributed to his marriage to Betty.
And then there was David Filvaroff who could do no right after
getting himself entangled in the question of the use of our placement facilities by the military and who over and over expressed
bewilderment at Alan's continuous, unabated anger.
Now none of us was anything approaching blameless in
these disputes. At the same time, all demonstrate what was for
Alan a difficult problem-the relationship between community
and moral authority. Each one of us had, in Alan's opinion, acted in a way that had breached what he saw as the proper
bounds of behavior in some community. Yet the grounds for
Alan's judgments often left those on the short end wondering
what, other than a rather stern idiosyncrasy, was the basis for
his judgment. It was, I believe, this difficult problem that also
played itself out in Alan's disputes with two larger communities
of scholars.
When the views of the critical race theorists and the feminists converged in an approach to modern life that emphasized
the climate of social interaction, stressing positive images"people of color," not "minorities"-and the connection between
what we say and how others feel about themselves as links in a
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chain of self-esteem that makes possible social advancement and
then joined with the academic liberals to enforce these norms
under an understanding that saw deviations from such polite
behavior as 'harassment," Alan began to get really angry. The
key event was long talks with his daughter, Jenny, about political correctness at Wesleyan in the course of helping her with a
paper she was writing. Alan had been politically incorrect all of
his life and the notion that there was some orthodoxy of the left,
the party that he had supported for all of those years, was simply something that he could not stomach. His fury knew no
bounds. At the same time his disenchantment with Critical Legal Studies was coming to a head. For several years he and
Betty had been co-secretaries of the organization, a job they
took over when Mark Tushnet was no longer willing to bear
that burden. In that role Alan clearly obtained a certain amount
of pleasure presiding over his flock of dues backsliders and with
Betty's help produced several newsletters of both intellectual
and artistic note. But at the same time he became conscious
that he and Betty were presiding over the death of the organization. And so they passed the job to Peter and Gary Peller.
Most often Alan explained his action and the associated disaffection with CLS by saying that, "CLS is dead." He never embraced my sense that the movement died because no one in the
group ever had a second, big idea and instead let itself get absorbed in the politically similar, but intellectually quite different, concerns of its black students and its female spouses and
students, but he never disagreed either. Instead, he was more
likely to observe conclusorily, "That time has passed, Schlegel."
Or, more disparagingly, "It's all so much bull shit." But underneath these more direct expressions was to be found a recurrent
sense that the relevant issues had changed, but that the group's
concerns had not. Dozens of times in recent years I heard him
say of an article by a CLS member, "It's the same, tired old
stuff." The plight of the unionized factory worker, the college
graduate feminist or the middle class minority was simply not
the center of Alan's concern any more and therefore, he felt it
should not be the center of anyone's concerns. Indeed, here
Alan's dislike of the pretentious talk of the academic intellectuals merged with his substantive concerns. That there were
plenty of people, a whole liberal academic intelligentsia, concerned with workers, women and minorities, debating the same
old questions-capital v. labor, sameness v. difference, integration v. separateness--criticizing the self-interest of others while
offering the same, self-centered solutions and, when challenged,
acting like a threatened species even though firmly in control of
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academic power and prestige was the problem as he saw it. This
hubris of the newly powerful brought forth not sadness, but
rage.
Whether Alan's shift in concern was from a deep and abiding need to be in the opposition or whether he was a real visionary in shifting concern to the white lower and lower middle
class when that class was most ignored by the liberal intelligencia is an interesting question the answer to which probably
tells more about the answerer than about Alan. He was deeply
troubled, no that word is too weak, offended by the actions of
his party, the party of the left, when it reached power, its failure to see new problems, its attachment to old interest groups,
its disparagement of the values of effectively powerless American citizens and its intolerance of views that contradicted its
own. And so, while he never gave up on the indeterminacy of
doctrine or on its essentially political valence, never doubted the
subordinate position of some women and some minorities in
American society, Alan parted company with CLS, feminist and
critical race theorists and went his own way. All had become
part of the problem and not part of the solution, as we used to
say.
Part of that problem, maybe the biggest part, lay in moral
authority. As far as Alan could see, few of the claims asserted by
minorities, women, workers and homosexuals amounted to anything more than a self-centered assertion of, "I want mine too."
For Alan, who was deeply engaged in the justification of doctrine, that simply wasn't a sufficient moral claim against the
community. It was whining. Whining wouldn't do. But the difficulty for Alan was that, while he was vitally interested in
grounding the moral authority of the community and thus in
the foundation of claims against the community, he had real
problems with community as an empirical entity. He clearly did
not approve of the exclusions that are part of forming a community. I suppose that he understood about the multiplicity of communities that at least the critical race theorists and empiricists,
such as David Engel, emphasize; we never talked about the subject. But as a constitutional law scholar confronting not claims
to be let alone, but claims for state interference with (and thus
state reversal of policies that aided) extant legal norms, he
needed to, or at least was prone to, see community as a unitary
entity. If one is uncomfortable dealing with real, empirical communities, the question of what is the moral ground for altering
extant norms is even harder, for it is in some sense an abstract,
formal question. As there would be a single rule for an entire
political entity, the relevant community is the people of that en-
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tity, taken as a whole and not as some pluralist sum of the
parts. At least that is how Alan seemed to approach it.
But if Alan had problems with community as an empirical
entity, he had real problems with moral authority as an empirical fact. If ever there were a boy who was born with the old
bumper sticker "RESIST AUTHORITY" clutched in his little
pink hands it was Alan. Though he always talked as if deans
should exercise their authority when he thought that they were
being wishy-washy, Alan could wholeheartedly support only the
weakest, most non-threatening kinds of actual authority, and
then only when he perceived that authority as undermining an
earlier stronger authority. "Don't tell me what to do," was a common taunt when I tried to organize faculty to do anything while
playing at Associate Dean. And deriding the possessors of political authority from Nixon to Clinton was a non-contact, indoor
sport for the man. Thus, again, as befits an inhabitant of the
common-law world, when it came to moral authority Alan similarly needed to, or at least was prone to, see authority as a unitary, abstract or formal principle of the kind that could justify
legal rules.
For Alan the community could not possibly be the source of
its own moral authority; after all, it was the community that
had excluded blacks from participation in it and on the flimsiest
of moral grounds. And law was not the source of moral authority either. While a doctrinalist, Alan was no positivist; it was
law's rules that needed justification, not that provided it. For a
while, I think, Marxism provided the moral justification for a
community's norms that Alan felt was needed and lacking. But
by the time I got to know him well Marxism was being discarded, its disappearance covered by a choice to publish almost
nothing. Marxism's positivist prescriptions, its faith in the
transformative potential of the working class, were for Alan,
somewhat ironically, too "undialectical." More common alternatives were even less acceptable. The faith of the liberal legal intelligencia in the moral authority of "civic republicanism" always
brought forth derisive laughter-and the shade of John C. Calhoun-from Alan. And the related left-liberal version of thisthe self-evident virtue of the aspirations of what Alan once
called "the left's army of the dispossessed"--was anything but
self-evident to him, especially since Alan felt that the aspirations of these individuals were hardly unitary and that the aspirations asserted on their behalf by their self-appointed representatives elided the conservative religious foundation of much
of minority culture.
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For a while, I think, Alan flirted with grounding the moral
authority of the community in "species being," Marx's debt to
Aristotle. This was during the time when his transition from
Marxism to the religious values of the community crossed with
the terrible reality of Bruno. That dog, about as stupid as any
mammal could be, too large and gracelessly rambunctious for a
home or a suburban yard and so cowardly that he peed wherever he was standing when looked at cross-eyed, was a monument to the degenerative effects of inbreeding and should have
been disposed of in some humane way, most plausibly by placing him at some large country estate, as he was placed in the
end. But for years Alan could not bear to do so; Bruno had provided comfort as had the goats and chickens when Alan was recovering from his first serious bout with colitis. And so he and
Betty endured.
Was there something natural to a species that could ground
moral behavior? What could we learn about this question from
examining our behavior toward other species in their being?
These questions were implicitly explored in a series of seminars
called Animals (and the Law). What was learned about them
was never made clear to me or, I suppose to the deans who had
to defend the course to skeptical alumni. But a grand time was
had by all and that may be the real point of seminars anyway.
Under the cover of concern with the political correctness debate that brought forth some wonderful constitutional law exams, the best of which was about Goya's famous painting, The
Naked Maja, animals was replaced by abortion as the topic of
choice and with it the search for the moral authority of community norms in the religious understanding of that community.
Here it should be made clear that Alan's concern was not with
exploring the mysteries of faith, much less of grace. He believed
in saving souls-he once shouted at me tearfully, "I'm fighting
for your soul, Schlegel! - - but the process held no fascination for
him. Rather, Alan's concern was with the moral imperatives
seen to be entailed by faith and in the reverse, the community
of understanding that follows from a shared faith. And he applauded examples of that entailment, for example when the
Catholic bishops linked opposition to abortion with opposition to
the death penalty and support for social welfare programs, and
he derided examples of what he saw as the failure to see entailment, as in the mainstream Protestant churches' response to
changing sexual mores in general and to abortion in particular.
In the "Politics of Virtue" he and Betty seem to have come
to the conclusion that religious thought-at a rather high level
of abstraction-could provide the needed moral basis for, and so
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a limit on, the community's exercise of authority. Alan acted
that conclusion out in the little community that was Chautauqua and the chautauqua, a combination of serious religious concern and good fellowship. It replaced for him the community
that he found lacking at the Law School and was a summer replacement for the community he sought with his law students,
or at least some of them. And he enjoyed the community of
scholars that was the law and religion conference at Hamline. It
replaced the community that he had lost with the demise of
CLS.
This is not the place nor am I the person to evaluate the
plausibility of Alan's conclusions, only to understand them. If, as
I once suggested, CLS was valuable simply as a "lonely hearts
club for left wing law professors," then there is nothing wrong
with other lonely hearts clubs; they may be the only healthy agglomeration of humans the modern world affords us. Maybe the
exercise of the authority of the community that is law needs
constant justification, though it is at least possible that the freedom of the citizen is more secure the more insecure and challengeable is that authority. Maybe the normative justification of
the rules of law is the most important part of a legal education
and understanding of the practices of lawyers the least. Maybe.
Maybe. Maybe. Who gives a shit! Alan's musings, the stuff he
would bring to our recurrent phone conversations, made the day
more interesting and kept the brain in working order during the
tedium of the semester. While in the medium run the topics had
a certain repetitive sameness, in the short run and the long run
it was a great, wild ride. Alan's friendship was not an unmixed
blessing-as if mine or that of any one of us is. Indeed, we had
an explosive confrontation over the homosexual rights agenda
less than six months before he died. But Alan was a great, good
friend and as in the case of other great, good friends his loss diminishes ourselves. He was a great, good friend whose being
and company I loved. He was a great, good friend and I do and
will continue to miss that great, wild ride intensely.

